Information service of the Pontifical Mission Societies since 1927
(Russia News)
by Cosimo Graziani
New Delhi (Agenzia Fides) - The unfortunate outcome of the elections in the world's most populous democracy for the Indian government has raised the suspicion among more than one observer that Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in order to regain consensus, might revive the strongly nationalist line that allowed him to take power ten years ago.
From the beginning, Modi has been a supporter of the concept of "Greater India" or rather "Indivisible India", which envisages the reunification of all the geographical and political components of the subcontinent - from Pakistan to Bangladesh to Sri Lanka - although it is not clear in what form.
The thesis of a predictable revival of the nationalist line, however, in reality collides with two facts. First, the failed landslide victory has in reality brought only a very limited drop in the votes collected, amounting to about 1 percent. So it was not a collapse, and Modi's expectations were disappointed only due to the multiplier effect of the Indian majority electoral system. The second element is that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its leader have pursued an essentially cautious foreign policy over the past decade. While the Himalayan border overheated again between 2020 and 2023 and tensions with Pakistan remain unresolved, it is notable that neither crisis has crossed the point of no return. With the government in Beijing, a striking imbalance in bilateral trade has allowed a relationship based on mutual economic interest to be maintained, right up to the arrival of a new Chinese ambassador to New Delhi (something that has not happened for a long time). In addition, India is a full member of the BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where leadership is firmly in Chinese hands: Modi is an effective representative of the South of the world, which looks to the West with the increasing weight of a rapidly growing economy (without the corona pandemic, the annual average would be 7.2 percent).
Even the attitude towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when analyzed according to objective criteria, appears essentially "neutral".
With the Kremlin, in exchange for non-condemnation, India was able to conclude advantageous oil contracts, which were necessary to boost the national economy. On the other side of the scale are the intensive contacts with the Western powers, facilitated by membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between Australia, India, Japan and, above all, the United States. The Indian government is cautious in the coming years mainly because it must ensure steady and controlled economic development. India is not only the most populous democracy in the world, but also the most populous country in the world with its 1.4 billion inhabitants. The average age of the Indian population is 28 years. The growth of industry, services, finance and the implementation of the necessary infrastructure measures require stability. The prime minister must create jobs (the employment rate for men is 36 percent, for women 12 percent) and manage the transformation of the agricultural sector, which urgently needs modernization in both technical and social terms. Indeed, so far the Indian government has managed to combine undeniable pragmatism with skillful diplomatic work, so that the connection with the West represented by the Quad has made the country the preferred partner not so much of the United States as of Japan (which promises to build the infrastructure Modi needs). China did not feel threatened in an area such as the Indo-Pacific. The markets of the two Asian giants remain open to each other, and both can tie themselves to Russian pipelines and the powerful people who operate them in the context of the Ukraine war. A game of admirable balancing acts, which, thanks also to an unofficial partnership with France in the western Indian Ocean and a skilful management of relations with Great Britain (which, after leaving the EU, is increasingly aware of how fleeting the dreams of an autonomous global policy after Brexit were), culminated in the success achieved by hosting the G20 summit in 2023.
India reassures, India is accepted everywhere. So why should the policy change? In reality, the danger exists, even if it is far from being realized.
The sending of the new Chinese ambassador to New Delhi took place just a few days before the elections and seemed to have the intention of recognition and at the same time of preparing future agreements. But then the electoral result that everyone was expecting did not materialize. A review of foreign policy, especially in bilateral relations between China and India, could therefore not be carried out by Modi, but rather by the Beijing leadership, perhaps precisely in the Indo-Pacific region. (Agenzia Fides, 12/7/2024)
